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Abstract
A large body of research indicates that psychopathic individuals lie chronically and show little remorse or anxiety. Yet, little
is known about the neurobiological substrates of dishonesty in psychopathy. In a sample of incarcerated individuals
(n¼67), we tested the hypothesis that psychopathic individuals show reduced activity in the anterior cingulate cortex (ACC)
when confronted with an opportunity for dishonest gain, reflecting dishonest behavior that is relatively unhindered by
response conflict. During functional magnetic resonance imaging, incarcerated offenders with different levels of
psychopathy performed an incentivized prediction task wherein they were given real and repeated opportunities for
dishonest gain. We found that while incarcerated offenders showed a high rate of cheating, levels of psychopathic traits did
not influence the frequency of dishonesty. Higher psychopathy scores predicted decreased activity in the ACC during
dishonest decision-making. Further analysis revealed that the ACC was functionally connected to the dorsolateral prefront-
al cortex, and that ACC activity mediated the relationship between psychopathic traits and reduced reaction times for
dishonest behavior. These findings suggest that psychopathic individuals behave dishonestly with relatively low levels of
response conflict and that the ACC may play a critical role in this pattern of behavior.
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Introduction
Psychopathy is a complex personality disorder characterized by
the severe disruption of moral behavior due to interpersonal
and emotional detachment (Hare and Neumann, 2008).
Psychopathy is believed to affect 1% of the general population
and 15–25% of the prison inmates (Hare, 1991, 2003; Kiehl, 2006).
Classical clinical observations suggest that morally
unacceptable behavior is more common among psychopaths
than non-psychopaths (Cleckley, 1941, 2015). One remarkable
example is the level of dishonesty observed in psychopathic
individuals; psychopaths frequently lie for enjoyment
(Lilienfeld and Fowler, 2006), a phenomenon that Ekman (1985)
termed ‘duping delight’. Psychopaths also lie with minimal guilt
or anxiety. As Cleckley (1941, 2015) observed, ‘The psychopath
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shows a total disregard for truth and is to be trusted no more in
his accounts of the past than in his promises for the future of
his statement of present intentions’.
An important question is: what makes psychopathic individ-
uals behave dishonestly? Is there a distinct neural process that
facilitates, or at least reflects, dishonesty in psychopathy?
Several previous neuroimaging studies have investigated the
neural substrates of deception in psychopathic individuals
(Nunez et al., 2005; Fullam et al., 2009; Glenn et al., 2017; Shao
and Lee, 2017). These studies reported associations between re-
gional brain activity during deception and various aspects of
psychopathy. Although these studies shed light on the relation-
ship between deception and psychopathy, an important limita-
tion was that the study participants were being asked to lie for
the purposes of the study. Thus, deception described in these
previous studies involved neither temptation nor morally ques-
tionable behavior.
We have developed an ecologically valid (dis)honesty task in
which participants are given repeated opportunities to gain
money by lying about their accuracy in a prediction task
(Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and Greene, 2014). More specific-
ally, participants report on their accuracy in predicting the out-
comes of random coin-flips and gain money for (self-reported)
accuracy. In some cases participants do not reveal their predic-
tions in advance, thus giving them the opportunity to gain
money by lying. Participants who behaved dishonestly, as indi-
cated by improbably high self-reported accuracy, exhibited
increased activity in control-related regions such as the lateral
prefrontal cortex when lying and when refraining from lying
(Greene and Paxton, 2009). Our follow-up study further revealed
that dishonest moral decisions were associated with increased
activity in the lateral prefrontal cortex and anterior cingulate
cortex (ACC) (Abe and Greene, 2014). Other studies using a simi-
lar experimental paradigm combined with event-related poten-
tials or near-infrared spectroscopy have also consistently
shown the involvement of control-related regions for dishonest
behavior (Ding et al., 2013; Hu et al., 2015).
Among the control-related regions described earlier, the
ACC’s activity is likely to be related to cognitive conflict in re-
sponse to an opportunity for dishonest gain. The ACC is reliably
recruited in tasks producing high levels of cognitive conflict
such as the Stroop task (MacDonald et al., 2000) and responding
to moral dilemmas (Greene et al., 2004). Additionally, ACC activ-
ity predicts greater prefrontal activity and behavioral adjust-
ments in cognitively demanding tasks (Kerns et al., 2004).
Although some studies have argued that ACC function is pre-
served in psychopathy (Blair, 2005; Glenn et al., 2010), past litera-
ture has demonstrated decreases in task-related activity in the
ACC across a variety of experimental paradigms (Kiehl et al.,
2001; Birbaumer et al., 2005; Cope et al., 2014). These findings
suggest that dishonesty in psychopathy is at least partly related
to diminished cognitive conflict when opportunities for dishon-
esty gain arise, and this may be reflected in ACC activation in
given such opportunities. We therefore hypothesized that
higher psychopathic traits would be associated with increased
dishonesty, reduced reaction times (RTs) for dishonest deci-
sions, and reduced ACC engagement.
To test this hypothesis, we recruited a large sample of incar-
cerated offenders scoring low, medium, and high on the Hare
Psychopathy Checklist-Revised (PCL-R) (Hare, 1991, 2003) to
complete functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) scan-
ning during our incentivized prediction task. The use of incar-
cerated control participants in our study has the advantage of
avoiding confounding psychopathy with criminality and factors
related to criminal lifestyle (Koenigs et al., 2011). To our know-
ledge, this study is the first attempt to characterize the neural




These results are based on data from 67 adult males incarcer-
ated in a medium-security North American correctional facility.
Participants gave written informed consent in accordance with
a protocol approved by the Ethical and Independent Review
Services. Intelligence quotient (IQ) was estimated using the
Vocabulary and Matrix Reasoning subtests of the Wechsler
Adult Intelligence Scale (Wechsler, 1997; Ryan et al., 1999). The
Wide Range Achievement Test Word Reading subtest was used
to assess reading level (Wilkinson, 1993). All participants com-
pleted the Structural Clinical Interview and underwent an inter-
view and file review to assess history of central nervous system
abnormalities and drug or alcohol abuse (First et al., 2002). The
exclusion criteria were as follows: age < 18 years or > 55 years,
non-fluency in English, reading level lower than a fourth grade
level, IQ score < 70, a history of seizures, prior head injury with
loss of consciousness > 30 min, any Axis I diagnosis as per the
Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders, Fourth
Edition (American Psychiatric Association, 1994), lifetime
history of a psychotic disorder or family history of a psychotic
disorder in a first degree relative, and current alcohol or drug
use. Participants were paid at a rate consistent with the facility
hourly labor wage ($1 USD/h). Participants were eligible for
bonus pay up to $5/day based on their performance during the
experimental tasks as per prison regulations.
Subjects were divided into three groups to isolate differences
due to psychopathy. Individuals with a PCL-R total score  30
were assigned to a high-psychopathy group (n ¼ 18), those
with a score 21–29 were assigned to a medium-psychopathy
group (n ¼ 17), and those with a score < 20 were assigned to a
low-psychopathy group (n ¼ 32) (i.e. the control group in this
study). In this study, the PCL-R was used as both a continuous
measure (i.e. in a regression analysis) and a dichotomous diag-
nosis (i.e. for between-group comparisons). Use of the PCL-R as
a continuous measure is well established (e.g. Decety et al.,
2013; Philippi et al., 2015; Fede et al., 2016).
Our analyses also required the classification of participants
as honest, dishonest or ambiguous based on self-reported ac-
curacy in the opportunity condition of the coin-flip task.
Consistent with prior methods (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe
and Greene, 2014), 43 participants reporting improbably high
levels of accuracy at the individual level (binomial test, all P-val-
ues < 0.001) were classified as dishonest (mean ‘accu-
racy’¼ 90.5%). This conservative threshold was used to ensure a
sufficient number of cheat trials per participants classified as
dishonest. Of these, nine were high-psychopathy offenders, 12
were medium-psychopathy offenders and 22 were low-
psychopathy offenders. The 20 lowest-accuracy participants (bi-
nomial test, all P-values > 0.05) were classified as honest (mean
accuracy¼ 53.3%). Of these, nine were high-psychopathy
offenders, four were medium-psychopathy offenders, and
seven were low-psychopathy offenders. Note that we are not
claiming that there was no dishonest responding at all within
this group. Rather, our classification is based on the observation
that the level of dishonesty in this group is sufficiently low that
it cannot be detected with confidence, even at the group level.
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The remaining four participants (one medium-psychopathy of-
fender and three low-psychopathy offenders) were classified as
ambiguous (mean accuracy¼ 65.9%). While it is clear that at
least some individuals in the ambiguous group behaved dishon-
estly (174/264 trials, group binomial test, P < 0.001), we classified
these individuals as ‘ambiguous’ because none of them met our
conservative threshold for dishonest behavior at the individual
level (Table 1).
Cognitive task
To measure dishonesty, we used a coin-flip prediction task in
which participants had opportunities to gain money dishonest-
ly by lying about the accuracy of their predictions (Figure 1)
(Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and Greene, 2014). We used a
cover story to justify the obvious opportunity for dishonest
gain. This study was presented as a study of paranormal abil-
ities to predict the future, aimed at testing the hypothesis that
individuals are better able to predict the future when their pre-
dictions are (i) private and (ii) financially incentivized. Thus,
participants were implicitly led to believe that the opportunity
for dishonest gain was a known but unintended byproduct of
the experimental design, and that they were expected to behave
honestly. We note that in employing this cover story, partici-
pants were deceived about the experimenters’ interests, but not
about the economic structure of the task. Participants were not
presented with the cover story until after they had been
recruited in order to avoid self-selection for participants with
interests in parapsychology. Participants were given a thorough
explanation of the task procedure and were familiarized with
the coin-flip task in practice trials.
In the coin-flip task, participants attempted to predict the
outcomes of random computerized coin-flips and were finan-
cially rewarded for accuracy or punished for inaccuracy. First,
the participant observed the monetary value of the trial and pri-
vately predicted the outcome of the upcoming coin-flip (2 s).
Then, the participant recorded their prediction by pressing one
of two buttons (no-opportunity condition) or pressed one of the
buttons randomly (opportunity condition) (2 s). Finally, the par-
ticipant observed the outcome of the coin-flip (1 s) and indi-
cated whether the prediction was accurate (3 s). The participant
then observed the amount of money won/lost based on the
recorded prediction (no-opportunity condition) or the reported
accuracy (opportunity condition) (1 s) and waited for the next
trial (11 s). Thus, in the no-opportunity condition, participants
recorded their predictions in advance, such that they did not
have an opportunity to cheat by lying about their accuracy. In
the opportunity condition, participants made their predictions
privately and were rewarded based on their self-reported accur-
acy, affording them the opportunity to cheat. Each participant
completed a total of 210 trials. Values $3, $4, $5, $6 and $7 USD
appeared 14 times each in 70 opportunity trials and 70
no-opportunity trials. We included an additional set of 70 low-
value opportunity trials with the values $0.02, $0.10, $0.25, $0.35
and $0.50 USD also appearing 14 times each. Data from the lat-
ter trials were not analyzed because contrasts involving this
condition could not be controlled for monetary value. Rather,
low-value opportunity trials were included to provide dishonest
participants with additional opportunities to behave honestly at
little cost, thus giving them cover for cheating in the regular
(higher value) opportunity trials. Net losses were capped at $0
and net winnings were capped at $75 (not including participa-
tion payment), although the actual bonus pay was scaled down
in accordance with the pay scale permitted by the prison
($5/day). Specifically, we let the participants know that the
dollar amounts for all of the trials are reduced (the scaling
factor: 1/15), although their decisions still had financial conse-
quence throughout the task. Trials were randomized in a series
of 7 blocks of 30 trials each. Each block of the coin-flip task
lasted 10 min. It should be noted that the inmates tested may
have suspected that the experiment was related to (dis)honesty
as they are not ordinarily given opportunities for dishonest gain
by institutional agents such as researchers. Although this is a
genuine limitation of this study (or any study attempting to
study dishonesty among incarcerated individuals), we empha-
size that our focus is on comparisons ‘within’ the inmate popu-
lation. Thus, our key findings are unlikely to be confounded by
level of suspicion.
Table 1. Cross tabulation of participant classification and mean self-reported accuracy (% trials claimed as wins)
Categorical classification of level of cheating
Dishonest Ambiguous Honest Total
High 9 (88.2%) 0 9 (55.4%) 18 (71.8%)
Psychopathic traits Medium 12 (92.2%) 1 (68.1%) 4 (52.0%) 17 (81.4%)
Low 22 (90.6%) 3 (65.1%) 7 (51.4%) 32 (79.6%)
Total 43 (90.5%) 4 (65.9%) 20 (53.3%) 67 (77.9%)
Table 2. Descriptive population statistics (n ¼ 67)











American Indian or Alaska Native 14.9
Asian 0.0




Total score 22.1 7.3
Factor 1 score 5.9 4.1
Factor 2 score 13.5 3.5
IQ, intelligence quotient; PCL-R, Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised; SD, stand-
ard deviation.
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Image acquisition and data preprocessing
Whole-brain imaging was performed with a 1.5-T Siemens
Magnetom Avanto mobile unit equipped with a 12-element
head coil. A T2*-weighted echo planar imaging (EPI) sequence
sensitive to blood oxygenation level-dependent (BOLD) contrast
was used for functional imaging with the following parameters:
repetition time¼ 2000 ms, echo time¼ 39 ms, flip angle¼ 75,
acquisition matrix¼ 64  64, field of view¼ 240 mm and in-
plane resolution¼ 3.75  3.75 mm. Twenty-seven axial slices
(slice thicknesses¼ 4 mm and interslice gap¼ 1 mm) were
obtained. Head motion was restricted using padding and a
restraint. Visual stimuli were presented via a back-projection
system, and participant responses were collected using a
magnet-compatible response box. Task presentation was
implemented using the Presentation software package
(Neurobehavioral Systems, Albany, CA). EPI images were
acquired in seven consecutive runs. The first five images from
each run were discarded to allow for T1 equilibration effects.
Data pre-processing and statistical analyses were performed
using SPM12 (Wellcome Department of Imaging Neuroscience,
London, UK). All volumes were spatially realigned to the first
volume and the time series for voxels within each slice was
temporally realigned to the middle slice. The resulting volumes
were normalized to a standard EPI template based on the
Montreal Neurological Institute (MNI) reference brain (re-
sampled voxel size¼ 2 2 2 mm). The normalized images
were smoothed with an isotropic 8-mm full width at half max-
imum Gaussian kernel. A high-pass filter of 1/128 Hz was used
to remove low-frequency noise, and an AR (1) model was used
to correct for temporal autocorrelations.
Statistical analysis
Self-reported accuracy data and RTs were analyzed using stand-
ard parametric tests. We first analyzed associations between
psychopathic traits and self-reported accuracy using Pearson
correlation test and t-test. We then focused on the dishonest
group (n ¼ 43) and examined the association between psycho-
pathic traits and RTs for dishonest moral decisions using ana-
lysis of variance (ANOVA) and Pearson correlation test. fMRI
data were analyzed using an event-related model. All events of
interest were modeled through convolution with a canonical
hemodynamic response function temporally indexed by partici-
pant responses in the context of the general linear model.
Parameter estimates (betas) for each condition were calculated
for all brain voxels, and the following two contrasts of param-
eter estimates were computed: opportunity win vs no-
opportunity win and opportunity loss vs no-opportunity loss.
The first contrast was designed to identify signal differences
associated with (but not exclusively associated with) dishonest
behavior. The second contrast was meant to identify signal
associated with honest behavior in the presence of opportunity
for dishonest gain. In the neuroimaging analysis, data from the
ambiguous group were excluded because of an extremely low
number of individuals classified into the group (i.e. four individ-
uals). In addition, honesty-related activity (opportunity loss vs
no-opportunity loss) in the dishonesty group was not analyzed
due to a low number of opportunity loss trials in a large number
of participants.
Second-level analyses on dishonesty-related activity in 43
dishonest participants were performed using both a regression
analysis and a subtraction analysis (i.e. one- and two-sample t-
tests). In the regression analysis, contrast images of opportunity
win trials vs no-opportunity win trials for all dishonest partici-
pants (n ¼ 43) were entered into a series of multiple regression
analyses, in which the PCL-R total score was the main predictor.
Supplementary analyses were also performed to control for the
effects of covariates including participant age and IQ on neural
activity associated with dishonest moral decisions. Specifically,
each covariate was incorporated as a nuisance variable into a
model that examined activity associated with opportunity win
trials (relative to no-opportunity win trials), with PCL-R total
score as the main predictor. In a one-sample t-test, the contrast
images of opportunity win trials vs no-opportunity win trials
were pooled for high-psychopathy offenders (n ¼ 9) and low-
psychopathy offenders (n ¼ 22), respectively. In the two-sample
t-test (i.e. between-group analysis), the contrast images of
opportunity win trials vs no-opportunity win trials were
directly compared between high-psychopathy offenders and
low-psychopathy offenders. Second-level analyses on honesty-
related activity (i.e. opportunity loss trials vs no-opportunity
loss trials) in 20 honest participants were also performed
using both a regression analysis (entire sample) and a
subtraction analysis (high- and low-psychopathy groups) (see
Supplementary Results).
For whole-brain analyses, statistical maps were assessed
at an uncorrected threshold of P < 0.001 at the voxel level,
and clusters were considered significant if they passed a
Fig. 1. Task sequence of the coin-flip task. The participant observed the trial’s
monetary value and privately predicted the outcome of the upcoming coin-flip.
The participant then recorded this prediction by pressing 1 of 2 buttons (no-op-
portunity condition) or pressed a button randomly (opportunity condition). The
participant then observed the outcome of the coin-flip, indicated whether the
prediction was accurate, and observed the amount of money won/lost based on
the recorded prediction (no-opportunity condition) or self-reported accuracy
(opportunity condition). Trials were followed by a fixation interval. Op, oppor-
tunity condition.
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cluster-level threshold of P < 0.05 after family wise error (FWE)
correction. When necessary, the small volume correction (SVC)
method (FWE-corrected, P < 0.05) was applied to a region of
interest (ROI) in the ACC, driven by our a priori hypothesis. For
this purpose, we used anatomical masks of the bilateral ACC
created with the automated anatomical labeling atlas (Tzourio-
Mazoyer et al., 2002) implemented in WFU PickAtlas software
(Wake Forest University, Winston-Salem, NC) (Maldjian et al.,
2003). We also used MarsBaR software (Brett et al., 2002) to ex-
tract percentages of change in BOLD signal in the ACC for add-
itional ROI analyses. The peak voxels of clusters exhibiting
reliable effects are reported in MNI coordinates.
Results
Demographic data
Demographic data for the 67 subjects are summarized in Table 2.
There were significant differences among the three groups in
terms of age [F(2, 64)¼ 3.54, P ¼ 0.035]; although the medium-
psychopathy group was significantly younger than the high-
psychopathy group [t(33)¼ 2.54, P ¼ 0.016, two-tailed] and low-
psychopathy group [t(47)¼ 2.38, P ¼ 0.022, two-tailed], no differ-
ence was observed between the high- and low-psychopathy
groups [t(48)¼ 0.09, P ¼ 0.931, two-tailed]. There were no differen-
ces among the three groups in terms of IQ [F(2, 64)¼ 1.39,
P ¼ 0.258).
Self-reported accuracy
Self-reported accuracy data are summarized in Table 1. We first
analyzed the association between psychopathic traits and the
frequency of dishonest behavior. Specifically, we looked for a
correlation between PCL-R total scores and self-reported accur-
acy in the entire sample (n ¼ 67), but no significant correlation
was observed (r¼0.18, P ¼ 0.140, two-tailed). A between-group
comparison (i.e. high- vs low-psychopathy group) similarly
revealed no significant difference [t(48)¼ 1.42, P ¼ 0.161, two-
tailed].
Reaction times
RT data are summarized in Table 3. Because we were interested
in RTs for dishonest moral decisions, we focused on data
obtained from the dishonest group (n ¼ 43) and tested an associ-
ation between psychopathic traits and RTs for opportunity win
trials. We first conducted a 3 (group: high-, medium- or low-
psychopathy) 2 (condition: opportunity or no-opportunity) 2
(outcome: win or loss) ANOVA. We excluded data from four
inmates with no opportunity loss trials (i.e. self-reported accur-
acy of 100%). Thus, the ANOVA included data from 39
participants. There were significant main effects of condition
[F(1, 36)¼ 6.56, partial g2¼ 0.15, P ¼ 0.015] and outcome [F(1,
36)¼ 28.25, partial g2¼ 0.44, P < 0.001]. There was also a signifi-
cant two-way interaction between condition and outcome [F(1,
36)¼ 10.39, partial g2¼ 0.22, P ¼ 0.003]. This interaction effect
was driven by longer RTs for opportunity loss trials,
as compared with those of no-opportunity loss trials
[t(38)¼ 3.48, p ¼ 0.001, two-tailed). There was no significant
difference in RTs between opportunity win trials and no-
opportunity win trials [t(38)¼0.92, P ¼ 0.365, two-tailed]. This
pattern of findings indicates that additional controlled process-
ing was required when dishonest participants forewent oppor-
tunities for dishonest gain, consistent with our previous
findings (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe and Greene, 2014).
We next examined the relationship between psychopathic
traits and RTs for the opportunity condition. Based on the previ-
ous findings indicating that psychopathic individuals are impul-
sive decision-makers (Cleckley, 1941, 2015; Kiehl, 2006), we
predicted that psychopathic inmates tend to make faster
responses when there is an opportunity for dishonest gain, but
not when there is no opportunity. As predicted, the PCL-R total
scores were inversely (but only marginally) correlated with the
RTs for the opportunity condition (r¼0.28, P ¼ 0.068, two-
tailed), whereas the PCL-R total scores were not correlated with
the RTs for the no-opportunity condition (r¼0.13, P ¼ 0.392,
two-tailed). To test for a difference between these two correla-
tions, we compared the correlation coefficients using a test of
two overlapping correlations in the same group (Hittner et al.,
2003). The direct comparison revealed a statistically marginal dif-
ference (z¼1.67, P ¼ 0.095, two-tailed). Thus, these data provide
suggestive, but not conclusive, evidence for the predicted rela-
tionship between degree of psychopathy and faster responding
in the presence of an opportunity for dishonest gain.
Because we are primarily interested in dishonest behavior, we
then considered, in greater detail, this RT effect for the opportun-
ity win trials, i.e. those that included the dishonest behavior. The
PCL-R total scores were inversely and marginally correlated with
RTs for opportunity win trials (r¼0.28, P ¼ 0.066, two-tailed)
(Figure 2A). The correlation between the RT for opportunity win
trials and PCL-R factor 2 score was marginal (r¼0.30, P ¼ 0.053,
two-tailed), and that between RT for opportunity win trials and
PCL-R factor 1 score was non-significant (r¼0.25, P ¼ 0.107,
two-tailed). As suggested by the results of the ANOVA, a
between-group comparison failed to detect any significant differ-
ence in RTs for opportunity win trials between the low- and high-
psychopathy groups [t(29)¼1.55, P ¼ 0.133, two-tailed].
Dishonesty-related activity in inmates classified as
dishonest
We first considered dishonesty-related activity (i.e. the oppor-
tunity win vs no-opportunity win contrast) in 43 individuals
who were classified as dishonest. To examine psychopathy
from a dimensional perspective rather than a categorical one,
PCL-R total scores were computed as continuous variables in
the regression analysis. PCL-R total score was negatively corre-
lated with dishonesty-related activity in several brain regions
including the left ACC (Figure 2B and C and Table 4). These
results were virtually unchanged when we additionally con-
trolled for age and IQ. We then examined whether the BOLD sig-
nal in the left ACC (based on the anatomically defined ROI)
showed a similar negative correlation with PCL-R factors 1 and
2 scores. The results revealed that both the factor 1 (r¼0.51, P
< 0.001, two-tailed) and factor 2 scores (r¼0.39, P ¼ 0.009,
Table 3. RTs (ms) in the dishonest group (n ¼ 43)
Condition






High 623 6 57 863 6 164 665 6 97 7656 76
Medium 649 6 74 979 6 210 652 6 73 7766 123
Low 694 6 52 973 6 166 693 6 51 8056 84
Data represent the mean 6 95% CI.
Op, opportunity.
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two-tailed) were negatively correlated with left ACC activity,
indicating that the reduced ACC activity is specifically related to
both factor 1 (interpersonal and affective traits) and factor 2
(lifestyle and antisocial traits).
In subtraction analyses, participants were selected from the
extremes of the PCL-R score distribution to generate psychop-
athy and control groups. The results of a one-sample t-test for
the high-psychopathy group (n ¼ 9) revealed no suprathreshold
activation. A one-sample t-test for the low-psychopathy group
(n ¼ 22) failed to detect significant activation in the left ACC, but
the SVC method (using anatomical masks of the bilateral ACC;
FWE-corrected, P < 0.05) revealed significant activation in the
left ACC (MNI coordinates: 4, 26, 22; peak-level corrected P
value¼ 0.01).
We then directly compared dishonesty-related activity (i.e.
the opportunity win vs no-opportunity win contrast) in the low-
and high-psychopathy groups. The high- versus low-
psychopathy group contrast did not reveal any significant
Fig. 2. Psychopathy, RTs, and ACC activity. (A) Scatter plot and correlation of PCL-R total score with RT in opportunity win trials across dishonest participants (r ¼
0.28, P ¼ 0.066). Histogram bars represent the RT based on the groupwise comparisons (mean 6 95% CI). (B) Results of a whole-brain regression analysis indicating a
negative relationship between PCL-R total score and activity in the left ACC during decisions including many dishonest moral decisions (i.e. opportunity win vs no-op-
portunity win) across dishonest participants. (C) Scatter plot and correlation of PCL-R total score and percent signal change in left ACC (r ¼ 0.51, P < 0.001). To avoid
potential issues regarding circularity and double dipping, signal change was extracted from the anatomically delimited left ACC region. Histogram bars represent ACC
signal based on groupwise comparisons (mean 6 95% CI). (D) Results of the mediation analysis. Unstandardized regression coefficients and bias-corrected 95% CIs for
the indirect effect from a bootstrap-mediation analysis demonstrated that left ACC activity during dishonest moral decision-making mediated the relationship be-
tween psychopathic traits (i.e. PCL-R total score) and RT for opportunity win trials among 43 inmates classified as dishonest. ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; PCL-R,
Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised.
Table 4. Results of the regression and subtraction analyses of dishonesty-related brain activation (i.e. op win > no-op win)









Z value Cluster size
x y z
Regression: Negative correlation between the PCL-R total score and the dishonesty-related activity (n ¼ 43)
Left ACC (24)a 2 28 20 0.036 0.086 <0.001 4.56 165
Left medial superior frontal gyrus (10) 14 60 14 <0.001 0.327 <0.001 4.17 458
Left thalamus 12 8 4 0.004 0.415 <0.001 4.08 271
Regression: Controlling for age and IQ
Left ACC (24)a 2 28 20 <0.001 0.206 <0.001 4.32 693
Right pallidum 10 0 2 0.004 0.362 <0.001 4.13 278
Subtraction: Dishonest classifications in the high-psychopathy group (n ¼ 9)
No suprathreshold activation
Subtraction: Dishonest classifications in the low-psychopathy group (n ¼ 22)
No suprathreshold activationb
Subtraction: Dishonest classifications in the high-psychopathy group vs low-psychopathy group
No suprathreshold activation
Subtraction: Dishonest classifications in the low-psychopathy group vs high-psychopathy group
No suprathreshold activationb
aSignificant even using the SVC method for the anatomically defined ACC (FWE-corrected, P < 0.05).
bThe results of ACC were significant when using the SVC method for the anatomically defined ACC (FWE-corrected, P < 0.05).
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; IQ, intelligence quotient; Op, opportunity; PCL-R, Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised; SVC, small volume correction.
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differences in regional activation, and the opposite contrast
again revealed no significant differences in any brain regions.
However, differences in the ACC region was significant using a
FWE-corrected threshold (P < 0.05) when calculated using the
SVC method and anatomical masks of the bilateral ACC (MNI
coordinates: 4, 26, 22; peak-level corrected P value¼ 0.038).
Mediation analysis
We conducted a bootstrap-mediation analysis in which psycho-
pathic traits, percentage change in BOLD signal in the ACC
(based on the anatomically defined ROI), and RT for the oppor-
tunity win trials were modeled as the independent, mediating,
and dependent variables, respectively (see Supplementary
Materials and Methods for details). The results revealed a mar-
ginally significant total effect of PCL-R total score on RT (total
effect¼0.005, P ¼ 0.066), and this effect disappeared after con-
trolling for the effects of mediation factors (direct effect¼
0.002, P ¼ 0.515). Furthermore, a bias-corrected 95% CI for the
indirect effect size did not include 0 (0.0071 to 0.0004), indi-
cating a significant indirect effect of psychopathic traits on RTs
for dishonest moral decisions via ACC activity (Figure 2D).
Psycho–physiological interaction analysis
We conducted a psycho–physiological interaction (PPI) analysis
to identify regions showing increased functional connectivity
with the left ACC during dishonest moral decision-making (i.e.
the opportunity win vs no-opportunity win contrast) (see
Supplementary Materials and Methods for details). We hypothe-
sized that control-related regions including the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (DLPFC) would be functionally connected with the
left ACC. Supporting our hypothesis, we identified increased
functional connectivity between the left ACC and several cor-
tical regions including the left DLPFC (Table 5 and Figure 3). We
also examined whether the psychopathic traits were negatively
correlated with functional coupling between the left ACC and
left DLPFC and observed no significant relationship.
Discussion
Using both continuous and between-group comparison
approaches, we found that psychopathy was characterized by
decreased ACC activity during dishonest moral decision-
making, such that the level of ACC activity was a significant me-
diator of the relationship between psychopathic traits and
reduced RTs for dishonest behavior. To the best of our know-
ledge, this study is the first to examine the neural substrates of
dishonesty in psychopathy using the task providing real oppor-
tunities for dishonest gain.
In this study, we did not identify a significant association be-
tween psychopathic traits and the frequency of dishonest be-
havior, which appears to be discordant with our a priori
prediction. However, this is nevertheless consistent with a high
level of dishonesty in psychopathic individuals compared with
normal individuals. We emphasize that the proportions of par-
ticipants classified as dishonest in the high-psychopathy group
(i.e. 50%) and in the whole sample (i.e. 64%) were much higher
than those reported in previous studies by our group using
healthy participants (i.e. 40%) (Greene and Paxton, 2009; Abe
and Greene, 2014). Thus, it appears that criminal behavior, ra-
ther than psychopathic traits per se, is closely linked to the fre-
quency of dishonest behavior, at least in the present context.
We found that psychopathic traits were marginally inversely
correlated with RTs for dishonest moral decision-making, and
that this relationship was mediated by decreased ACC activa-
tion. These observations may provide insight into the mecha-
nisms of psychopathic individuals who behave dishonestly. We
propose that when making decisions to behave dishonestly,
psychopathic individuals experience reduced response conflict,
either because of a lack of moral concern about behaving dis-
honestly or a relative insensitivity to the strategic dimensions
Fig. 3. Results of a PPI analysis using the left ACC as the seed region. A function-
al connectivity analysis demonstrated that the left ACC was functionally con-
nected to the left DLPFC during dishonest moral decision-making (opportunity
win vs no-opportunity win). ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral
prefrontal cortex.
Table 5. Results of a PPI analysis with the left ACC as the seed region














Right cerebellum 26 82 18 <0.001 0.049 <0.001 4.74 421
Right insula 52 18 6 <0.001 0.319 <0.001 4.21 560
Left inferior frontal gyrus (extending to left DLPFC) (47) 24 44 8 0.003 0.33 <0.001 4.20 282
Right thalamus 4 6 4 0.002 0.411 <0.001 4.12 286
Left middle occipital gyrus (18) 26 90 2 0.036 0.751 <0.001 3.82 158
ACC, anterior cingulate cortex; DLPFC, dorsolateral prefrontal cortex.
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of the choice. Atypical information processing in the ACC in
psychopathic individuals may facilitate, or at least reflect, rela-
tively automatic dishonest moral decision-making. We empha-
size that this cognitive profile appears to differ not only form
those of ordinary people, but also from those of non-
psychopathic incarcerated individuals. These results regarding
the reduced engagement of the ACC are broadly consistent with
the hypothesis that psychopathy involves severe deficits in the
integration of socio-affective information during decision mak-
ing (Cleckley, 1941, 2015; Newman and Lorenz, 2003).
Our results provide additional evidence for a dual-process
framework regarding the cognitive underpinnings of honest
and dishonest behavior, based on the interplay between con-
trolled and automatic processes. By this we do not wish to
imply that such processes operate completely independently.
Instead, we regard automatic processes as essential to all
decision-making while controlled processes, when engaged,
modulate input–output pathways, enabling behavior to be
directed away from more automatic responses based on intern-
al goals and situational features (Miller and Cohen, 2001; Dayan,
2012). Within this framework, automatic responses can be more
‘hot’ while controlled processes are more ‘cold’ (Metcalfe and
Mischel, 1999), but this need not be the case, as in classic cogni-
tive tasks such as the Stroop task (MacDonald et al., 2000; Kerns
et al., 2004) and in the Cognitive Reflection Test (Frederick, 2005).
For present purposes, we are agnostic as to whether the more
automatic responses observed here are ‘hot’.
Within this framework, there is a qualitative distinction be-
tween tasks that do and do not require control, as manifest in
classic neuropsychological dissociations (e.g. Perret, 1974;
Koenigs et al., 2007). However, in neurologically intact individu-
als, the distinction between automatic and controlled process-
ing typically manifests as behavior along a continuum, as
control can be applied to varying degrees. Across a range of
tasks, this variation can be reflected in both RTs (Koechlin et al.,
2003) and in the observed engagement of the prefrontal control
network, including both ACC and DLPFC (Miller and Cohen,
2001). We regard the “bottom-up” detection of conflict in the
ACC, and typically one or both competing processes, as auto-
matic, while we regard the ‘top-down’ modulation of task re-
sponse by the DLPFC as controlled (Botvinick et al., 2001).
In the case of honest behavior, we previously provided
evidence that consistently honest behavior requires no active
self-control, whereas both honest and dishonest behaviors in
individuals who behave dishonestly are associated with add-
itional controlled processing (Greene and Paxton, 2009). We also
provided evidence that responses to anticipated reward are an
important determinant of (dis)honest behavior, with relatively
weak responses to anticipated rewards predicting ‘graceful’
honesty, but allowing for the possibility that individuals who re-
spond more strongly may resist temptation by force of will (Abe
and Greene, 2014). Paralleling this distinction in honest behav-
ior, two distinct processes are considered with respect to dis-
honest behavior, i.e. ‘willful’ controlled dishonesty and a more
automatic, ‘disgraceful’ tendency toward dishonesty. The pre-
sent results further refine this idea, suggesting that the degree
of psychopathy is a modulating factor in determining whether
dishonest behavior is more controlled or ‘willful’ (low-psychop-
athy group) vs more automatic or ‘(dis)graceful’ (high-psychop-
athy group).
In our PPI analysis, we observed increased functional con-
nectivity between the left ACC and left DLPFC during dishonest
moral decision-making (i.e. the opportunity win vs no-
opportunity win contrast), consistent with the hypothesis that
ACC causes the engagement of the DLPFC, which then serves a
self-regulatory function (MacDonald et al., 2000; Kerns et al.,
2004). In light of this, as well as our finding of decreased engage-
ment of ACC as a function of higher psychopathy scores, one
might expect to see a similar relationship between DLPFC activ-
ity and PCL-R scores during dishonest decision-making.
Consistent with this, we observed a negative correlation be-
tween DLPFC activity during opportunity-win trials for dishon-
est subjects and total PCL-R scores, though this effect did not
survive correction for multiple comparisons (see
Supplementary Results).
An alternative interpretation of our current observations is
that the effects observed in the ACC simply reflect attentional
modulation. Attentional deficits have been proposed as central
to psychopathy, with psychopathic individuals having relatively
intact top-down attention, but abnormal reflective shifting in
bottom-up attention (Moul et al., 2012). Other researchers have
suggested that socioemotional deficits in psychopathy are due
to situation-specific abnormalities in attention, such that these
individuals have difficulty processing affective information
when it is peripheral to their primary attentional focus
(Newman and Lorenz, 2003). We believe that this attentional ac-
count and the cognitive conflict account described above are
not mutually exclusive, as differences in attention may produce
differences in levels of response conflict.
From these data one might infer that ACC function is
impaired in psychopathic individuals, but that need not be the
case. On the contrary, it is possible that ACC function is normal
in all of the individuals tested and that the observed differences
in ACC activity related to RT and psychopathy may simply be
downstream consequences of functional differences or deficits
elsewhere. Consider, as an analogy, the ACC activity of individ-
uals engaged in the color-naming Stroop test performed in a
foreign language. Here, participants may exhibit reduced ACC
activity, relative performing a native-language Stroop task, and
this may reflect reduced response conflict. But this, of course,
need not reflect ACC dysfunction. Rather, the reduced conflict
and related ACC activity is best explained by the nature of the
decision inputs, whereby the meanings of the unintelligible for-
eign color words fail to conflict with the colors of the ‘ink’ in
which the words are displayed. Likewise, the present ACC
effects may reflect normal ACC function, but abnormal inputs
to decision involving fewer competing considerations for psy-
chopaths deciding whether or not to behave honestly.
Related to the point described earlier, the absence of amyg-
dala activation in this task does not inform regional dysfunction
in psychopathic individuals as anticipated by past literature
(Kiehl, 2006; Blair, 2007). In fact, it is possible that decreased re-
sponsiveness of the ACC to opportunities for dishonest gain
was related to reduced input from the amygdala. Past literature
has indicated strong connectivity between the amygdala and
anterior portions of the dorsal ACC (Etkin et al., 2011; Shackman
et al., 2011). The amygdala is thought to be important for valence
representation in stimulus-reinforcement associations in moral
socialization (i.e. learning that certain behaviors are harmful to
others and should be avoided) (Blair, 2007). Thus, dysfunction
within a network involving the ACC and amygdala might make
psychopathic individuals less sensitive to the aversive conse-
quences of moral transgressions, and thus less likely to avoid
dishonest moral decisions. Here, we emphasize that it is not
surprising that no effect was observed in the amygdala in this
study. Unlike some other experimental paradigms that have
measured dishonesty in an interpersonal context (e.g. Garrett
et al., 2016), the coin-flip prediction task does not involve
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causing harm to a specific person, which healthy people in
most contexts find intrinsically aversive. Indeed, our previous
studies using the coin-flip prediction task did not elicit amyg-
dala activation (Greene and Paxton, 2009, Abe and Greene,
2014).
Although this study did not yield any striatal effects associ-
ated with psychopathy, another potentially critical neural
mechanism underlying impulsive dishonest decision-making in
psychopaths is heightened ventral striatal subjective value sig-
naling. Unlike the monetary incentive delay (MID) task
(Knutson et al., 2001a,b) used in our previous work linking
increased striatal responses to dishonest behavior (Abe and
Greene, 2014), the coin-flip task itself is not optimized for the
detection of striatal effects related to the representation of sub-
jective value. This is partly due to the rapid succession of dis-
tinct cognitive events during the coin-flip task (see Materials
and Methods), each with distinct implications for subjective
value. This is also due to the modulation of subjective value
based on whether and to what extent the participant is
responding honestly, an endogenous variable that reduces ex-
perimental control. To examine more precisely the role of striat-
al subjective value representations in the dishonest decision-
making of psychopaths, it will likely be necessary to use other
tasks such as the MID. For example, Buckholtz et al. (2010) used
the MID to show that psychopathic traits in a nonclinical sam-
ple are associated with heightened reward-related nucleus
accumbens activity. More recently, Hosking et al. (2017) used a
delay-discounting task to demonstrate that striatal valuation
signals are dysregulated during inter-temporal choice in psych-
opathy. Although past results do not speak directly to this ques-
tion, the extant evidence suggests that striatal hyper-reactivity
may be a key factor in dishonest decision-making in psycho-
pathic individuals. We leave this possibility as a topic for future
research.
This study has several limitations. First, we note once again
that one of our more suggestive findings, the inverse correlation
between psychopathic traits and RTs for dishonest moral
decision-making, was only marginally significant. This effect
awaits confirmation in future studies. We note, however, that
this relationship was significantly mediated by ACC activity,
consistent with our hypothesis. Second, our task design did not
allow us to identify individual lies; whereas some of the oppor-
tunity win trials involved decisions to lie, other opportunity win
trials were won honestly. This limitation, however, is more like-
ly to lead to a false negative result than a false positive result,
and therefore provides no specific reason to discount the posi-
tive results reported here. Finally, although the present experi-
mental paradigm did involve morally questionable behavior in
response to real opportunities for financial gain, our paradigm
nevertheless employs a highly reduced interpersonal context.
Thus, these results should be interpreted cautiously with
awareness of their limited generalizability. Despite these limita-
tions, these results provide evidence that dishonesty in psycho-
pathic individuals is cognitively distinct from that of other
individuals exhibiting antisocial behavior and that this is
related to relatively low levels of decision conflict reflected in
reduced engagement of the ACC, as well as a mediating effect of
ACC activity on RTs.
Supplementary data
Supplementary data are available at SCAN online.
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